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Abstract
This paper presents a simple example of first-order theories T1 and T2
such that i) T1 can be embedded in T2 and vice versa, ii) T1 posits all of
the structure of T2 and vice versa, but iii) T1 and T2 are not equivalent.
This shows that theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-
Bernstein properties and are neither partially ordered by the relation ‘is
embeddable in’ nor by ‘posits all of the structure of’. In addition, these
results clarify the overall geography of notions of equivalence between the-
ories and yield two philosophical payoffs related to the recent discussions
of structure and equivalence.
1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in philosophy of comparing theories in terms of their
ontological commitments and, in more recent literature, in terms of their struc-
tural commitments. The most famous case of this latter kind of comparison
comes from the history of classical spacetime theories. It is standard to claim,
for example, that the Galilean theory of spacetime posits less structure than the
Newtonian theory of spacetime. The Newtonian theory comes equipped with
the structure required to single out a preferred inertial frame as the rest frame,
while the Galilean theory does not.1
It has recently been argued that we can appeal to this kind of structural
comparisons between theories to inform our judgments about equivalence of
theories (North, 2009; Barrett, 2019).2 If two theories disagree in terms of their
structural commitments, then we can infer that they are inequivalent. That
is, if two theories posit different structures — like the Galilean and Newtonian
theories of spacetime do — then they cannot ‘have the same content’ or ‘say the
same thing about the world’. It is uncontroversial that equivalent theories must
agree in terms of their structural commitments. But there are some further
natural principles relating structure and equivalence that are not as obvious. In
this paper we will consider the following two.
∗Draft of January 15, 2020. The authors can be reached at tbarrett@philosophy.ucsb.edu
and hhalvors@princeton.edu. Thanks to Laurenz Hudetz, [[. . . ]] for comments.
1See Geroch (1978), Friedman (1983), Earman (1989), and Maudlin (2012) for discussion.
2See Weatherall (2019b) for a review of the recent debate on equivalence of theories. See
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Principle 1. If T1 posits all of the structure of T2 and T2 posits all of the
structure of T1, then T1 and T2 are equivalent.
Principle 2. If T1 can be embedded in of T2 and T2 can be embedded in T1,
then T1 and T2 are equivalent.
Principle 1 captures an intuitive idea that one might have about structure
and equivalence. If one theory posits all of the structure of the other — in
the sense that it can ‘build’ or ‘define’ all of that structure — and the other
posits all of the structure of the one, then we would expect them to posit the
same structure. Principle 2 is similarly intuitive. Suppose that one theory can
be ‘embedded’ in the other and the other can be ‘embedded’ in the one. This
means that we can think of the one as a ‘sub-theory’ of the other, and the
other as a ‘sub-theory’ of the one. In this case, we would again expect the
two theories to posit the same structure and to be equivalent. Surprisingly,
however, neither Principle 1 nor Principle 2 is true. This means that theories
are neither partially ordered by the relation ‘posits all of the structure of’ nor
by the relation ‘is embeddable in’. For reasons that we will discuss below, it
is natural to call Principle 2 the ‘Cantor-Bernstein property’ of theories and
Principle 1 the ‘co-Cantor-Bernstein’ property of theories.
The aim of this paper is to present a particularly simple example that demon-
strates that first-order theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-
Bernstein properties. This means that comparing the structural commitments
of theories requires much more care than might have initially been supposed.
2 Two theories
Consider the following two theories.3
The theory T1. T1 is formulated in the signature Σ1 = {σ, p0, p1, p2, . . .}
where σ is a sort symbol and each of the pi is a unary predicate sym-
bol. We define the theory as follows:
T1 = {∃=1x(x = x)}
T1 says that there is exactly one thing, but it is silent on whether or not
that thing is pi.
The theory T2. T2 is formulated in the signature Σ2 = {σ, q0, q1, q2, . . .} where
σ is a sort symbol and each of the qi is a unary predicate symbol. We
define the theory as follows:
T2 = {∃=1x(x = x),∀x(q0(x)→ q1(x)),∀x(q0(x)→ q2(x)), . . .}
3For preliminaries on model theory the reader is encouraged to consult Hodges (2008). For
additional discussion of these two theories see Halvorson (2012) and Barrett and Halvorson
(2016b).
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T2 says that there is exactly one thing, and that if that thing is q0, then
it is qi for all of the other i too. One can think of the predicate q0 as a
kind of ‘light switch’ that turns on all of the other predicates qi.
The first task of this paper is to examine these theories and the relationships
between them. In particular, we will demonstrate the following five claims.
1. T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
2. T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent.
3. There are conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 → T1.
4. There are essentially surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and K : T2 → T1.
5. There is no essentially surjective and conservative translation between T1
and T2 (in either direction).
It is natural to separate these claims into two kinds. The first two claims are
about what kinds of extensions exist for T1 and T2 (i.e. they have no common
definitional nor Morita extension), while the last three are about what kinds
of translations exist between T1 and T2. After proving these claims, we will
return to the general philosophical issues mentioned above and discuss how
these results demonstrate the falsity of Principles 1 and 2.
3 Extension
Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures with p ∈ Σ+ − Σ an n-ary predicate symbol. Recall
that an explicit definition of p in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(p(x1, . . . xn)↔ φ(x1, . . . , xn))
where φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a Σ-formula. A definitional extension of a Σ-theory
T to the signature Σ+ is a Σ+-theory
T+ = T ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ},
such that for each predicate symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ, the sentence δs is an explicit
definition of s in terms of Σ. One can also define new function and constant
symbols, but for our purposes this will not be important.
Recall that two theories are definitionally equivalent if they have a ‘com-
mon definitional extension’. More precisely: if T1 is a Σ1-theory and T2 is a
Σ2-theory, T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if there is a definitional ex-
tension T+1 of T1 to the signature Σ1 ∪Σ2 and a definitional extension T+2 of T2
to the signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2 such that T+1 and T+2 are logically equivalent (in the
sense that they have the same class of models).
We now have the following simple proposition.
Proposition 1. T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
3
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that T is a common definitional extension of
T1 and T2. Since T defines each of the predicate symbols of T2, there is a Σ1-
sentence φ such that T  ∀yq0(y)↔ φ. Now one can verify that the sentence φ
has the following property: If ψ is a Σ1-sentence and T1  ψ → φ, then either
(i) T1  ¬ψ or (ii) T1  φ→ ψ. But φ cannot have this property. Consider the
Σ1-sentence
φ ∧ ∀xpi(x)
where pi is a predicate symbol that does not occur in φ. We trivially see that
T1  (φ ∧ ∀xpi(x)) → φ, but neither (i) nor (ii) hold of φ ∧ ∀xpi(x). This is a
contradiction, so T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent.
It has recently been suggested that definitional equivalence is too strict a
standard of equivalence between theories, in the sense that it judges theories
to be inequivalent that we have good reason to consider equivalent. For exam-
ple, Euclidean geometry can be formulated with only a sort of points (Tarski,
1959), with only a sort of lines (Schwabha¨user and Szczerba, 1975), or with
both a sort of points and a sort of lines (Hilbert, 1930).4 Since these formula-
tions use different sort symbols, and we have so far provided no way of defining
new sort symbols, definitional equivalence does not capture any sense in which
they are equivalent. In order to address this shortcoming of definitional equiv-
alence, a more liberal standard of equivalence has been proposed. It has been
called “Morita equivalence” (by Barrett and Halvorson (2016b, 2017a,b)) and
“generalized definitional equivalence” (by Andre´ka et al. (2008)).5
The precise details of Morita equivalence are not important for our purposes
here, but the basic idea is simple. Morita equivalence allows one to define new
sort symbols — in addition to new predicate, function, and constant symbols
— using some basic construction rules. Two theories are then said to be Morita
equivalent if they have a ‘common Morita extension’, which is just like a common
definitional extension except that it might define new sorts. One can show
that geometry formulated in terms of points is Morita equivalent to geometry
formulated in terms of lines; one uses the sort of lines to build the sort of points,
and vice versa (Barrett and Halvorson, 2017a).
One might wonder whether our theories T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent.
The following simple result has already been demonstrated.6
Proposition 2. T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent.
Proof. The proof proceeds in precisely the same manner as the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. Barrett and Halvorson (2016b, Theorem 5.2) give the precise details.
4See Szczerba (1977) and Schwabha¨user et al. (1983, Proposition 4.59, Proposition 4.89).
5See also Hudetz (2017a,b) and Tsementzis (2015).
6The result goes through even if one formulates T1 and T2 using two different sort symbols,
instead of the same sort symbol σ.
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4 Translation
Our next three claims are about the kinds of ‘translations’ that exist between
these theories. We need some basic preliminaries.
Let Σ1 and Σ2 be signatures. A reconstrual F of Σ1 into Σ2 is a map from
the predicates in the signature Σ1 to Σ2-formulas that takes an n-ary predicate
symbol p ∈ Σ1 to a Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn) with n free variables.7 One can
think of the Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn) as the ‘translation’ of the Σ1-formula
p(x1, . . . , xn) into the signature Σ2. We will use the notation F : Σ1 → Σ2 to
denote a reconstrual F of Σ1 into Σ2.
A reconstrual F : Σ1 → Σ2 extends to a map from arbitrary Σ1-formulas
to Σ2-formulas in the natural recursive manner. In the case where one is only
considering signatures with predicate symbols (as we are here), this map is
particularly easy to describe. Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) be a Σ1-formula. We define the
Σ2-formula Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) recursively as follows.
• If φ(x1, . . . , xn) is xi = xj , then Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) is the Σ2-formula xi = xj .
• If φ(x1, . . . , xn) is p(x1, . . . , xn), where p ∈ Σ1 is an n-ary predicate sym-
bol, then Fφ(x1, . . . , xn) is the Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn).
• If Fφ and Fψ have already been defined for Σ1-formulas φ and ψ, then
we define the Σ2-formula F (¬φ) to be ¬Fφ, F (φ ∧ ψ) to be Fφ ∧ Fψ,
F (∀xφ) to be ∀xFφ, etc.
Suppose that T1 and T2 are theories in the signatures Σ1 and Σ2, respectively.
We say that a reconstrual F : Σ1 → Σ2 is a translation F : T1 → T2 if T1  φ
implies that T2  Fφ for every Σ1-sentence φ. A translation F gives rise to a
map F ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1), which takes models of the theory T2 to models
of the theory T1. For every model A of T2 we first define a Σ1-structure F
∗(A)
as follows.
• dom(F ∗(A)) = dom(A).
• (a1, . . . , an) ∈ pF∗(A) if and only if A  Fp[a1, . . . , an].
A straightforward argument demonstrates that F ∗(A) is indeed a model of T1
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2016a, §4).
A translation F : T1 → T2 is conservative if T2  Fφ implies that T1  φ
for any Σ1-sentence φ. We make two brief remarks about this concept. First,
one can think of a conservative translation as a kind of ‘injection’ or ‘embedding’
on sentences. Indeed, one can easily verify that the following simple condition
is equivalent to a translation F : T1 → T2 being conservative.
• For any Σ1-sentences φ1 and φ2, if T2  Fφ1 ↔ Fφ2 then T1  φ1 ↔ φ2.
7This notion naturally extends to signatures that contain function and constant symbols,
but that will be unimportant for our purposes. See Hodges (2008), Button and Walsh (2018),
and Barrett and Halvorson (2016a) for details.
5
This condition is clearly capturing a kind of injectivity on sentences: If a trans-
lation maps two Σ1-sentences to equivalent Σ2-sentences, then they must have
been equivalent to begin with. Second, one can easily verify that if a transla-
tion F : T1 → T2 is such that F ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1) is surjective, then F is
conservative.
We now have our first simple result concerning the existence of translations
between our theories T1 and T2.
Proposition 3. There are conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 →
T1.
Proof. Consider the reconstruals F : Σ1 → Σ2 and G : Σ2 → Σ1 defined by
F : pi 7−→ qi+1 G : qi 7−→ p0 ∨ pi
It is trivial that F : T1 → T2 is a translation. Since G maps the Σ2-sentence
∀x(q0(x) → qi(x)) to ∀x((p0(x) ∨ p0(x)) → (p0(x) ∨ pi(x))) and T1 entails this
latter sentence, it follows that G is a translation too.
It remains to show that F and G are conservative. One does this by showing
that F ∗ and G∗ are surjective. Suppose that M is a model of T1. Then M is
completely determined by which of the pi hold of the one thing. We let N be
the model of T2 defined as follows: N has the same domain as M , q0 does not
hold of the one thing in N , and qi+1 holds of the one thing in N if and only if
pi holds of the only thing in M . One trivially sees that F
∗(N) = M , so F ∗ is
surjective. A similar argument shows that G∗ is surjective.
Since they are conservative, the translations F and G from Proposition 3
can be thought of as injections or embeddings between the theories T1 and T2.
But there is a natural sense in which neither is ‘surjective’. For example, F
does not map any Σ1-formula to any logical equivalent of the Σ2-formula q0(x).
The following property makes this thought precise. We say that a translation
F : T1 → T2 is essentially surjective if for every Σ2-formula ψ there is a Σ1-
formula φ such that T2  ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ Fφ(x1, . . . , xn)). One can
easily verify that neither F nor G from Proposition 3 are essentially surjective.
But we do have the following simple result.
Proposition 4. There are essentially surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and
K : T2 → T1.
Proof. Consider the reconstruals H : Σ1 → Σ2 and K : Σ2 → Σ1 defined by
H : pi 7−→ qi K(qi) =
{
p0 ∧ ¬p0 if i = 0
pi−1 otherwise
It is trivial that H is an essentially surjective translation. Since K maps the
Σ2-sentence ∀x(q0(x)→ qi(x)) to ∀x((p0(x)∧¬p0(x))→ pi−1(x)) and T1 entails
this latter sentence, it follows that K is a translation. It is easy to see that K
is essentially surjective.
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One can verify that the theory T1 does not entail the sentence ∀x(p0(x) →
p1(x)), but T2 does entail H(∀x(p0(x)→ p1(x))). Similarly, the theory T2 does
not entail ¬∀xq0(x), but T1 does entail K(¬∀xq0(x)). This means that neither
H nor K is conservative.
One therefore wonders whether there is any translation between T1 and T2
that is essentially surjective and conservative. One might consider a transla-
tion like this to be an ‘isomorphism’ between the two theories. The following
proposition settles this issue.
Proposition 5. There is no essentially surjective and conservative translation
between T1 and T2 (in either direction).
Proof. Suppose that there is a translation F : T1 → T2 that is essentially
surjective and conservative. We show that this implies that T1 and T2 are
definitionally equivalent, which contradicts Proposition 1. (The same argument
demonstrates that there is no essentially surjective and conservative translation
T2 → T1.)
Let qi be one of the predicate symbols in Σ2. Since F is essentially surjective,
there is some Σ1-formula φi such that T2  ∀x(qi(x) ↔ φi(x)). This allows us
to define a reconstrual G : Σ2 → Σ1 by setting G(qi) = φi. One then uses the
fact that F is conservative to verify that G : T2 → T1 is a translation, and to
verify that both T1  φ ↔ GFφ and T2  ψ ↔ FGψ for all Σ1-formulas φ
and Σ2-formulas ψ. This means that T1 and T2 are intertranslatable, and so
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2016a, Theorem 2) implies that they are definitionally
equivalent.
5 Conclusion
We conclude by discussing three philosophical payoffs that these technical claims
yield.
Mutual faithful interpretability and Morita equivalence
The first concerns the recent debate about when two theories should be consid-
ered equivalent. A significant amount of attention has been devoted to better
understanding the relationships between different standards of equivalence of
theories and to applying these standards to various cases of interest.8 The sim-
ple example that we have considered here allows us to further clarify the overall
geography of standards of equivalence between theories.
8For discussion of these relationships, see for example Barrett and Halvorson (2016a,b) and
(Button and Walsh, 2018, p. 118). In addition to the recent articles on equivalence already
cited, see Barrett (2017), Coffey (2014), Curiel (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013),
Hudetz (2015, 2017a), Knox (2011, 2014), North (2009), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Rosenstock
and Weatherall (2016), Teh and Tsementzis (2017), Van Fraassen (2014), and Weatherall
(2016, 2017), and the references therein. See Weatherall (2019a) for a survey of recent work.
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Recall that T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable if there
are conservative translations F : T1 → T2 and G : T2 → T1.9 It is already
well known that definitional equivalence is a stricter standard of equivalence
than mutual faithful interpretability. More precisely, any pair of theories that
are definitionally equivalent are mutually faithfully interpretable, but there are
mutually faithful interpretable theories that are not definitionally equivalent
(Andre´ka et al., 2005; Button and Walsh, 2018). Morita equivalence, however,
is a more liberal notion of equivalence than definitional equivalence. So it is
natural to ask the following question.
If two theories T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, then
are T1 and T2 also Morita equivalent?
If the answer to this question were yes — that is, if mutual faithful inter-
pretability entailed Morita equivalence — this would be a mark against Morita
equivalence as a plausible standard of equivalence between theories. It is widely
accepted that mutual faithful interpretability is too liberal a standard of equiva-
lence; it considers theories to be equivalent that we have good reason to consider
inequivalent (Szczerba, 1977). So if the answer to the above question were yes,
this would immediately imply that Morita equivalence is too liberal a standard
as well.10
The answer to the above question, however, is no. It is not the case that
Morita equivalence is entailed by mutual faithful interpretability. Our discussion
here has demonstrated precisely this. It follows from Proposition 3 that our
theories T1 and T2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, but as was stated in
Proposition 2, they are not Morita equivalent.
The second and third payoffs of this discussion are of a more straightfor-
wardly philosophical nature. This example yields the following two surprising
conclusions about theories. It can be that one theory is embeddable in another
and the other is embeddable in the one, but the two theories are not equivalent.
And it can be that one theory ‘posits all of the structure’ of another and the
other ‘posits all of the structure’ of the one, but the two theories do not posit
the same structure.
The Cantor-Bernstein property
We begin by discussing the former. Recall Principle 2 from above.
Principle 2. If T1 can be embedded in T2 and T2 can be embedded in T1, then
T1 and T2 are equivalent.
Proposition 3 captures a sense in which our theory T1 can be embedded in
T2 and our theory T2 can be embedded in T1. The existence of the conservative
9See Button and Walsh (2018, p. 117). Our presentation here is slightly less general, since
we have not discussed translations with parameters.
10See McEldowney (2019), for example, for worries about Morita equivalence along these
lines.
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translation F : T1 → T2 shows us that T1 can be ‘viewed as a part of’ T2, or in
other words, that T1 is a ‘sub-theory’ of T2. It is easy to see how this is the case:
T1 can be viewed as the part of T2 that is constructed from the predicate symbols
q1, q2, . . . and so on. And similarly the existence of the conservative translation
G : T2 → T1 shows us that one can view T2 as a part of T1; it can be viewed as
the part of T1 that is constructed from the Σ1-formulas p0, p0∨p1, p0∨p2, . . . and
so on. Despite the fact that each of these theories can be embedded in the other,
they are not the same theory. Propositions 1, 2, and 5 substantiate this intuition.
Our theories T1 and T2 are not definitionally equivalent, Morita equivalent, nor
does there exist an essentially surjective and conservative translation between
them.
What we have shown here is that Principle 2 is false and that theories lack
the Cantor-Bernstein property. The Cantor-Bernstein theorem famously says
that if there are injections f : X → Y and g : Y → X between sets X and
Y , then there is a bijection between X and Y . Because of this theorem we say
that sets have the Cantor-Bernstein property. And indeed, it makes sense to
talk about the Cantor-Bernstein property for any category. One says that a
category C has the Cantor-Bernstein property if for any objects c and d of C
whenever there is a monomorphism (i.e. a generalization of the concept of an
injection) from c → d and a monomorphism d → c, the objects c and d are
isomorphic. The property captures a basic intuition one might have about the
notion of ‘being a part of’: If X is a part of Y and Y is a part of X, then X and
Y are the same. Our example here demonstrates that the category of theories
does not have the Cantor-Bernstein property.11 In other words, the analogue
of the Cantor-Bernstein theorem does not hold of theories: T1 and T2 can be
embedded into one another, but nonetheless they are not the same.12
This means that theories are not partially ordered by the relation ‘is embed-
dable in’. Recall that a partial order is one that is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and
transitive. It is trivially the case that the relation ‘is embeddable in’ is reflexive
and transitive on first-order theories. Since the identity translation is a conser-
vative translation, every theory is embeddable in itself. And if T1 is embeddable
in T2 and T2 is embeddable in T3, then — since the composition of conservative
translations is indeed a conservative translation — T1 is embeddable in T3. But
the results presented here imply that ‘is embeddable in’ is not anti-symmetric.
In order to be anti-symmetric, it would have to be the case that there are not
distinct theories T1 and T2 that are each embeddable in the other. The results
above demonstrate that there are theories T1 and T2 that are embeddable in
one another and are distinct, in the sense that they are not equivalent.
11There are various ways to ‘categorify’ the collection of first-order theories. The reader is
encouraged to consult Visser (2006) for details.
12Another example of the failure of the Cantor-Bernstein property is the relation between
classical and intuitionistic logic. Obviously, intuitionistic logic can be embedded in classical
logic. The famous Go¨del translation shows that intuitionistic logic can be embedded in clas-
sical logic. But it is nonetheless unnatural to think of the two logics as equivalent, as was
recently pointed out, for example, by Dewar (2018).
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The Co-Cantor Bernstein property
We now turn to our final payoff. It can be that one theory ‘posits all of the
structure’ of another and the other ‘posits all of the structure’ of the one, but
the two theories do not posit the same structure. In other words, Principle 1 is
false.
Principle 1. If T1 posits all of the structure of T2 and T2 posits all of the
structure of T1, then T1 and T2 are equivalent.
This means that — just like the relation ‘is embeddable in’ — the relation
‘posits all of the structure of’ is not a partial order on theories. It is reflexive
and transitive, but it is not anti-symmetric. There are inequivalent theories T1
and T2 that both posit all of the structure of the other. It has already been
argued that there are theories that posit ‘incomparable’ amounts of structure,
in the sense that neither posits more nor less structure than the other (Barrett,
2015a,b). But this example shows that the structural commitments of theories
behave even more strangely than was initially thought. It is worth taking a
moment to discuss this in detail.
One might put this payoff as follows: It can be that one theory ‘is as ideo-
logically rich as’ another and the other ‘is as ideologically rich as’ the one, but
the two theories are not ideologically equivalent. The ideology of a theory is
usually thought of as the range of concepts that are expressible in the language
in which the theory is formulated (Quine, 1951). It takes a moment to explain
why our example yields this surprising conclusion about structure and ideology.
The existence of an essentially surjective translation H : T1 → T2 captures
a sense in which T1 has all the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T2.
The idea here is simple. When H is essentially surjective, any formula ψ that
one can formulate in the language of T2 is expressible using the language of T1;
that is precisely what the essential surjectivity of H guarantees. There is some
formula φ in the language of T1 that H translates to a logical equivalent of ψ.
Intuitively, this means that the theory T1 can define all of the structures that
T2 has. Or in other words, T1 can express all of the same concepts that T2 can.
Quine (1951, p. 15) himself remarks that one can investigate the ideology of a
theory by examining what kinds of translations exist between theories: “Much
that belongs to ideology can be handled in terms merely of the translatability
of notations from one language into another; witness the mathematical work on
definability by Tarski and others.”
One can grasp the basic idea here by considering the following two simple
examples. Suppose that T is a Σ-theory and consider the signature Σ+ =
Σ ∪ {p}, where p is a new unary predicate symbol not contained in Σ. We
consider the following two cases.
1. Suppose that T+ is the Σ+-theory that has precisely the same axioms as
T . There is a natural sense in which T+ has all of the structure of T , but
not vice versa; T+ has the new piece of structure p that T lacks. One
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can capture this basic idea by looking to facts about essentially surjective
translations between these two theories.
First, there is an essentially surjective translation T+ → T . The transla-
tion simply maps each symbol in Σ to itself and maps p to any Σ-formula
with one free variable. It is trivial to verify that this is indeed an essen-
tially surjective translation. This makes precise our basic intuition that
T+ is as ideologically rich as T . Second, since there is no Σ-formula that is
logically equivalent to p, the translation T → T+ that maps every element
of Σ to itself is not essentially surjective. This makes precise our intuition
that T is not as ideologically rich as T+.
2. Now suppose instead that T+ is a definitional extension of T to the sig-
nature Σ+. In this case there is a strong sense in which T and T+ have
precisely the same structure and ideological richness; p is not a piece of
structure that is new to T+. Rather, it is explicitly definable in terms of
those structures that T posits, so there is a strong sense in which T itself
already posits the structure p.
This basic intuition can be made precise by noticing that there are essen-
tially surjective translations T → T+ and T+ → T . It follows from our
discussion in point 1 above that there is an essentially surjective transla-
tion T+ → T . And since T+ is a definitional extension of T , the translation
T → T+ that maps every element in Σ to itself is in this case essentially
surjective. The Σ-formula φ that defines p is logically equivalent to p.
The existence of an essentially surjective translation from T1 to T2 captures
a strong sense in which T1 has all of the structure or ideological richness of T2.
The two examples above show that this idea is a direct generalization of the
kinds of simple examples that formed our intuitions about amounts of structure
and ideological richness in the first place.
In addition, the tools that have recently been used to compare amounts of
structure between theories cohere well with the idea that essentially surjective
translations capture facts about structure. It has been suggested — by Earman
(1989), and more recently by North (2009), Swanson and Halvorson (2012), and
Barrett (2015a,b) — that the size of an object’s automorphism group can be used
as a guide to the amount of structure that the object has. An automorphism
of an object is a structure-preserving bijection from the object to itself. If an
object has more automorphisms, therefore, that suggests that the object has less
structure that these automorphisms are required to preserve. The important
fact for our purposes here is the following: If there is an essentially surjective
translation from T1 to T2, this captures a sense in which the models of these
two theories have automorphism groups of precisely the same size.
It only takes a moment to make this claim precise. An automorphism of
a Σ-structure M is a bijection f : M → M that satisfies M  p[a1, . . . , an] if
and only if M  p[f(a1), . . . f(an)] for any predicate symbol p ∈ Σ and elements
a1, . . . , an ∈M . One can easily prove the following.13
13A similar argument actually demonstrates an even stronger result: If F is essentially
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Proposition 6. Let H : T1 → T2 be an essentially surjective translation with
N a model of T2. Then H
∗(N) and N have the same automorphism group.
Proof. If f : N → N is an automorphism of N , one can easily verify using
the definition of H∗ that f is also an automorphism of H∗(N). Suppose that
f : H∗(N)→ H∗(N) is an automorphism and let q ∈ Σ2 be a predicate symbol
in the signature of T2. We immediately see that for any a ∈ N :
N  q[a]⇐⇒ H∗(N)  φ[a]⇐⇒ H∗(N)  φ[f(a)]⇐⇒ N  q[f(a)]
Here φ is a Σ1-formula such that Hφ is logically equivalent to q, whose existence
is guaranteed by the essential surjectivity of H. The first and third bicondition-
als follow from this choice of φ and the definition of H∗, while the second follows
from the fact that f is an automorphism of H∗(N). This means that f is an
automorphism of N .
Our current best methods of comparing amounts of structure therefore lend
further support to the following claim: The existence of an essentially surjective
translation from T1 to T2 captures a sense in which T1 has all of the structure
or ideological richness of T2.
Now that we have this idea on the table, we can return to consider our pair
of theories T1 and T2. As we have seen in Proposition 4, there are essentially
surjective translations H : T1 → T2 and K : T2 → T1. This captures a sense
in which T1 has all of the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T2 and T2
has all of the structure of (or is as ideologically rich as) T1. But Propositions
1, 2, and 5 imply that T1 and T2 do not have the same structure or the same
ideology. This is completely intuitive: T2 has a special ‘light switch’ predicate q0
that ‘turns on’ all of the other predicates qi, while T1 contains no such structure.
This shows that Principle 1 is false and theories lack what one might call the
‘co-Cantor-Bernstein property’. It is easy to verify that if there are surjections
f : X → Y and g : Y → X between sets X and Y , then there is a bijection
between X and Y . One might call this the ‘co-Cantor-Bernstein theorem’, and
therefore say that sets have the co-Cantor-Bernstein property. Once again, it
makes sense to talk about the co-Cantor-Bernstein property for any category.
We can say that a category C has the co-Cantor-Bernstein property if for any
objects c and d of C whenever there is an epimorphism (i.e. a generalization of
the concept of an surjection) from c→ d and an epimorphism d→ c, the objects
c and d are isomorphic. Our example here demonstrates that the category of
theories does not have this proeprty. Our two theories T1 and T2 can be surjected
onto one another, but nonetheless, as Propositions 1, 2, and 5 tell us, they are
not equivalent. These concepts of amount of structure and ideological richness
are therefore much more subtle than one might have initially thought.
One might wonder how these results come to bear on the current debates
about structure and equivalence in philosophy of science. Real scientific the-
ories are, of course, much more complicated than theories in first-order logic.
surjective translation, then F ∗ is a full functor between the categories of models of T2 and T1
(Halvorson, 2019; Barrett, 2018).
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We therefore should be careful not to assume that the ‘category of all scien-
tific theories’ has all the features that the category of first-order theories has.
Nonetheless, we should take ‘no go’ results like the ones we have presented here
seriously. If the category of first-order theories fails to have some simple feature
— like the Cantor-Bernstein or co-Cantor-Bernstein property — then that gives
us reason to doubt that the category of all scientific theories will have that fea-
ture. For example, it would seem natural to think that if T1 is reducible to T2,
and T2 is reducible to T1, then T1 and T2 are equivalent theories. This is exactly
the kind of inference, however, that the results presented here about first-order
theories call into question.
References
Andre´ka, H., Madaras´z, J., and Ne´meti, I. (2008). Defining new universes
in many-sorted logic. Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest, 93.
Andre´ka, H., Madara´sz, J. X., and Ne´meti, I. (2005). Mutual definability does
not imply definitional equivalence, a simple example. Mathematical Logic
Quarterly, 51(6):591–597.
Barrett, T. (2019). Structure and equivalence. Forthcoming in Philosophy of
Science.
Barrett, T. W. (2015a). On the structure of classical mechanics. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(4):801–828.
Barrett, T. W. (2015b). Spacetime structure. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
51:37–43.
Barrett, T. W. (2017). Equivalent and inequivalent formulations of classical
mechanics. Forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Barrett, T. W. (2018). How to count structure. Manuscript.
Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. (2016a). Glymour and Quine on theoretical
equivalence. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(5):467–483.
Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. (2016b). Morita equivalence. The Review of
Symbolic Logic, 9(3):556–582.
Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. (2017a). From geometry to conceptual rela-
tivity. Erkenntnis, 82(5):1043–1063.
Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. (2017b). Quine’s conjecture on many-sorted
logic. Synthese, 194(9):3563–3582.
13
Button, T. and Walsh, S. (2018). Philosophy and Model Theory. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Coffey, K. (2014). Theoretical equivalence as interpretative equivalence. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(4):821–844.
Curiel, E. (2014). Classical mechanics is Lagrangian; it is not Hamiltonian. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(2):269–321.
Dewar, N. (2018). On translating between logics. Analysis, 78(4):622–630.
Earman, J. (1989). World Enough and Spacetime: Absolute versus Relational
Theories of Space and Time. MIT.
Friedman, M. (1983). Foundations of space-time theories: Relativistic physics
and philosophy of science. Princeton University Press.
Geroch, R. (1978). General Relativity from A to B. Chicago University Press.
Glymour, C. (2013). Theoretical equivalence and the semantic view of theories.
Philosophy of Science, 80(2):286–297.
Halvorson, H. (2012). What scientific theories could not be. Philosophy of
Science, 79(2):183–206.
Halvorson, H. (2013). The semantic view, if plausible, is syntactic. Philosophy
of Science, 80(3):475–478.
Halvorson, H. (2019). The Logic in Philosophy of Science. Cambridge University
Press.
Hilbert, D. (1930). Grundlagen der Geometrie. Teubner.
Hodges, W. (2008). Model Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Hudetz, L. (2015). Linear structures, causal sets and topology. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, pages 294–308.
Hudetz, L. (2017a). Definable categorical equivalence: Towards an adequate
criterion of theoretical intertranslatability. Forthcoming in Philosophy of Sci-
ence.
Hudetz, L. (2017b). The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages.
Forthcoming in Synthese.
Knox, E. (2011). Newton-Cartan theory and teleparallel gravity: The force of
a formulation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies
in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 42(4):264–275.
Knox, E. (2014). Newtonian spacetime structure in light of the equivalence
principle. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(4):863–880.
14
Maudlin, T. (2012). Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
McEldowney, P. A. (2019). On Morita equivalence and interpretability. Forth-
coming in The Review of Symbolic Logic.
North, J. (2009). The ‘structure’ of physics: A case study. The Journal of
Philosophy, 106:57–88.
Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Ontology and ideology. Philosophical Studies, 2(1):11–
15.
Rosenstock, S., Barrett, T. W., and Weatherall, J. O. (2015). On Einstein
algebras and relativistic spacetimes. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 52:309–
316.
Rosenstock, S. and Weatherall, J. O. (2016). A categorical equivalence between
generalized holonomy maps on a connected manifold and principal connec-
tions on bundles over that manifold. Journal of Mathematical Physics, 57(10).
arXiv:1504.02401 [math-ph].
Schwabha¨user, W. and Szczerba, L. (1975). Relations on lines as primitive
notions for Euclidean geometry. Fundamenta Mathematicae.
Schwabha¨user, W., Szmielew, W., and Tarski, A. (1983). Metamathematische
Methoden in der Geometrie. Springer.
Swanson, N. and Halvorson, H. (2012). On North’s ‘The structure of physics’.
Manuscript.
Szczerba, L. (1977). Interpretability of elementary theories. In Logic, Founda-
tions of Mathematics, and Computability Theory. Springer.
Tarski, A. (1959). What is elementary geometry? In The Axiomatic Method
With Special Reference to Geometry and Physics. North-Holland.
Teh, N. and Tsementzis, D. (2017). Theoretical equivalence in classical me-
chanics and its relationship to duality. Forthcoming in Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics.
Tsementzis, D. (2015). A syntactic characterization of Morita equivalence.
Manuscript.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (2014). One or two gentle remarks about Hans Halvorson’s
critique of the semantic view. Philosophy of Science, 81(2):276–283.
Visser, A. (2006). Categories of theories and interpretations. In Logic in Tehran.
Proceedings of the workshop and conference on Logic, Algebra and Arithmetic,
held October 18–22, 2003. ASL.
15
Weatherall, J. O. (2016). Are Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newto-
nian gravitation theoretically equivalent? Erkenntnis, 81(5):1073–1091.
Weatherall, J. O. (2017). Category theory and the foundations of classical field
theories. In Landry, E., editor, Forthcoming in Categories for the Working
Philosopher. Oxford University Press.
Weatherall, J. O. (2019a). Classical spacetimes. In Knox, E. and Wilson, A.,
editors, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics. Routledge.
Weatherall, J. O. (2019b). Theoretical equivalence in physics. Forthcoming in
Philosophy Compass.
16
